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Abstract The orthodox view of tense mandates that the present tense, when em-
bedded under a past attitude predicate, should give rise soley to what is called a
“double access” reading (Abusch 1997; Ogihara 1996; Ogihara & Sharvit 2012).
We consider a class of embedded presents which locate the embedded eventuality
neither at the time of utterance nor the time of the attitude. Unlike some other re-
cently identified cases of ill-behaved embedded tenses, we argue that our embedded
presents are instances of the historical present, a non-indexical use of the simple
present. This assimilation requires abandoning current theories of the historical
present, which treat it as a purely pragmatic contextual shift (Schlenker 2004; Anand
& Toosarvandani 2017). Building on Lewis (1978), we introduce an intensional
operator sensitive to a salient narrative in the context, which shifts a contextual
time coordinate to a temporal vantage point on that narrative. This unifies our
cases of embedded presents with their matrix counterparts, in fiction and non-fiction
narratives alike.
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1 Introduction
The behavior of tenses under attitude predicates has been a principal focus of the
semantics of tense. The orthodox view of the present tense in English is illustrated
in the logical forms below (Abusch 1997; Ogihara 1996; Ogihara & Sharvit 2012).
(1) TNS1 . . . ATT [PRES2 . . . P ]
a. PRES1 . . . ATTe1 [∅2 . . . Pe2 ] τ(e2) ⊆ TIME(u)
b. PAST1 . . . ATTe1 [PRES2 . . . Pe2 ] τ(e2) ⊇ [τ(e1),TIME(u)]
In general, PRES is indexical, picking out the time of utterance, TIME(u). When the
attitude predicate (ATT) and embedded predicate (P) both bear present tense, as in
(1a) and (2), the mechanisms responsible for sequence of tense conspire to make the
embedded present a “null tense” simultaneous with the attitude time. Consequently,
the run-time of P is indirectly indexical, contained in the utterance time.
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(2) My dad thinks masks don’t prevent the spread of COVID-19.
When present is embedded under past and sequence of tense does not occur, as in
(1b) and (3), the embedded present tense directly requires overlap with the utterance
time. Other factors imposed by the attitude (such as Abusch’s (1997)’s Upper Limit
Constraint) then lead to the so-called “double access” reading, in which P is located
at an interval containing both the utterance time and the time of the attitude.
(3) In March, the World Health Organization said that masks don’t need to
be worn by healthy people, unless they are caring for someone who is ill.1
Thus, regardless of the embedding tense, embedded presents pick out, either
directly or indirectly, intervals overlapping the utterance time (TIME(u)). In that
light, the following example from a 1963 New York state trial (Willie Clark v. New
York Transit Authority) is quite unexpected:
(4) Q: How fast were you travelling when the front of your car went across
the intersection and you saw the bus stop, how fast were you going?
A: Then I was doing about 15 miles an hour.. . .
Q: And you saide1 at that point you are movinge2 15 miles an hour. . .is
that right? τ(e2)< τ(e1)< TIME(u)
A: Yes.
In the final question, the defense attorney asks the plaintiff Willie Clark, who is
on the stand in 1963, about a statement he just made regarding his actions while
driving around 1:30 am on September 15, 1957. Thus, the time of the driving,
τ(e2), precedes the time of the statement, τ(e1), which itself precedes the time of
the question. And yet, the question is an instance of present-under-past (1b), which
should only permit a double access reading.
Such cases, where an embedded present describes an eventuality located prior to
the utterance time, are not rare and are attested across a range of genres, including
the example in (5a). Nor are they particularly difficult to construct, as (5b) shows.
(5) a. He gets maps from friends and calls in at local offices of the American
Automobile Association to get directions, but still gets lost several
times. . . I can’t remember how long it takes him, but it’s weeks.2
b. Warren’s position on her career has changed. In a 2007 interview, she
said that she leaves work to raise her family that year. On the campaign,
she said that she is shown the door.
1 https://www.politico.eu/article/as-europe-masks-up-coronavirus-covid19-the-netherlands-dithers/
(accessed September 20, 2020).
2 www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2006/07/travelling.html (accessed September 20, 2020).
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Our central intuition is that these embedded presents are instances of the historical
present (HP), which is sometimes also called the “narrative” present. The HP
appears in root contexts, describing actual eventualities located in the past of the
utterance time, in oral narratives and New Journalism reporting, as in (6a). It is also
widely used to describe fictional eventualities whose temporal location relative to
the utterance time is less obvious, as in (6b).
(6) a. Inez, the maid, brings in lunch on a tray, one rare hamburger, one
cheeseburger and a glass of tomato juice. Jane tastes the tomato juice.
“Oh,——!” she says. “It’s diet.”
(Tom Wolfe, “The Girl of the Year”)
b. Mr. Tulkinghorn takes out his papers, asks permission to place them on
a golden talisman of a table at my Lady’s elbow, puts on his spectacles,
and begins to read by the light of a shaded lamp.
(Dickens, Bleak House)
Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2014) propose that some embedded presents may be
instances of the HP. We argue, however, that extant accounts of the HP (Schlenker
2004; Anand & Toosarvandani 2017), designed for unembedded cases like (6a–b), do
not easily extend to embedded environments. In particular, we show that embedded
presents are available in free indirect discourse, a fact that we use to argue that
embedded presents cannot be handled by temporal de re.
Instead, we propose to link the temporal shifting of the HP to the presence of
an intensional operator NAR, a basic version of which is defined in (7). In essence,
NAR is a temporally-aware version of Lewis’s (1978) modal operator for fiction: it
considers the worlds compatible with a salient story that is retrieved anaphorically
(represented by the n subscript).
(7) J NARn-ti-w j λw φ Ku,a,g = 1 iff
∀〈w′, t ′〉 such that w′ is a world compatible with g(n) in w j at ti and
t ′ is the temporal vantage point on g(n) in w j at ti,
Jλw φ Ku,a[TIME→t
′],g(w′) = 1
Unlike Lewis’ operator, we propose that NAR considers times that represent the
temporal vantage point on a story — the perspective from which the story is being
considered — and it shifts the indexical time TIME(a) to that vantage point.
Importantly, the HP is used in both fiction and non-fiction narratives, with no
significant linguistic differences across these contexts. If a NAR operator like (7)
is responsible for the temporal shift of the HP, it should do this in an equivalent
fashion whether the narrative is intended to be true or not. Although Lewis was
concerned with how contingent facts about the actual world can intrude into our
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understanding of a fictional narrative, the ordering semantics he incorporates into
his fictional operator comes in handy here. Building on his original work, as well
as an extensive literature arising from it, we revise the NAR operator to naturally
encompass both fictional and non-fictional narratives, while independently enforcing
a temporal shift.
The paper is arranged as follows: In Section 2, we provide evidence that our
instances of embedded present are the HP, based on a shared restriction on aksionsart
and requirement for a narrative anchor. We then turn, in Section 3, to a potential
analysis in terms of temporal de re, ruling it out by looking at free indirect discourse.
In Section 4, we present our proposal for a NAR operator, focusing initially just on
the temporal dimension. In Section 5, we consider the intensional dimensions of the
operator.
2 Three hallmarks of the historical present
The HP has been characterized in terms of three hallmarks, two grammatical and one
pragmatic (Anand & Toosarvandani 2017). All three are found with our embedded
presents.
Considering its grammatical properties first, the HP discusses a time interval
that does not overlap the utterance time. While it is often used historically, so that it
locates an eventuality anterior to the utterance time, as in (6a), it is also possible in
the right circumstances to use the HP to talk about the future as well (Pancheva &
Zubizarreta 2020). Furthermore, while the canonical present is reserved for stative
eventualities (whether lexical or derived, as with progressives or habituals), the HP
is compatible with eventives as well: consider, for instance, the bolded verbs in (6).
The embedded presents in (5a–b) show both of these properties. The embedded
eventualities occur prior to the utterance time (indeed, prior to the attitude time),
and are eventive predicates — how long it takes him and that she leaves work to
raise her family. This latitude in aksionsart is particularly surprising, given that
embedded presents must be stative in the orthodox view (as must non-backshifted
past tenses) (Ogihara 1996; Gennari 2003). If these are embedded HPs, however,
the grammaticality of these eventive predicates is expected.
Beyond these grammatical distinctions, the HP has also been described as a prag-
matic choice that results in a more vivid or transporting experience for the reader
(Palmer 1965: 39, Leech 1971: 6–7, Close 1981: 106), an impression likely respon-
sible for the HP being eschewed in journalism prior to New Journalism’s emphasis
on intersubjectivity and audience enjoyment. At the same time, more contemporary
examinations of the HP within discourse analysis have downplayed the significance
of this felt vividness, which they take to be an optional effect. The suggested core
functions of the HP, in these approaches, include to segment a narrative by switching
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in and out of the present tense (Wolfson 1979), to foreground particular episodes in
the narrative (Fleischman 1990), or to mark the author/narrator’s opinions within the
text (internal evaluation, in Labov & Waletzky’s (1966) sense; Schiffrin 1981).
In all these characterizations, the HP is used to describe or discuss a narrative, a
story of some sort, regardless of what its ultimate function may be. Accordingly, we
might expect the HP not to be felicitous in typical information-seeking exchanges,
and indeed it is not. Consider the following exchange, modeled after an example by
Kratzer (1998: 106):3
(8) A: [Looking up at a church] Who built this church?
B: (In the 1630s,) Borromini {#builds, built} this church.
While the simple past is impeccable here, the HP creates the feeling that B is starting
a story, something not especially apt for answering an information-seeking question.
We note in this regard that questions that can be answered by an extended narrative
are considerably easier to respond to with the HP.
(9) A: [Looking up at a church] What’s the history of this church?
B: (In the 1630s,) the Trinitarians are looking for an architect. Borromini
volunteers to design it for free and is commissioned to build it,
cementing his fame.
Leaving such complexities aside, our embedded presents are likewise impossible in
an information-seeking exchange.
(10) A: What is Warren’s position on her career?
B: She said that she {#leaves, left} work to raise her family that year.
A crucial difference between this information-seeking context and the one above
involves the hearer (and speaker)’s expectations: when the historical present is
felicitous, it seems reasonable to assume, intuitively, that a story is being told. And
adding In a 2007 interview to (10) makes B’s reply better. In other words, our cases
of embedded presents, just like the HP in root contexts, require what we can call a
narrative anchor, which we will cache out below as anaphora to a salient narrative.
Before turning to a formal analysis, we should distinguish our cases of, what we
believe to be embedded HPs from some superficially similar cases that have been
mentioned in the literature. First, Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2014) and Bary &
Altshuler (2015) discuss some cases of present-under-past which appear not to have
3 We note here that the HP feels off even if it is anchored by a temporal frame adverbial like in the
1630s. This is different from what Kratzer notes for the German Präteritum, though we leave detailed
examination of this “narrative” past tense to future research.
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a double access reading: that is, the embedded eventuality intuitively fails to hold at
either utterance time or attitude time. In (11), the embedded eventuality holds at the
utterance time alone: the baggage claim agent cannot have the bicycle at the attitude
time because it is on the flight at that point. Conversely, in (12), the eventuality holds
at the attitude time alone: the eventuality of being in the room most likely fails to
hold at the time of utterance.
(11) [To a baggage claim agent after arriving on a flight]
On the flight, the flight attendant told me that you have my bicycle because
it’s oversized. (adapted from Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2014: 47)
(12) Everyone was looking at us funny. I couldn’t understand it. Then Paula
came up to us, with horror in her eyes. She whispered in my ear that we’re
in a room full of anti-communists and my wife’s coat is bright red.
(Bary & Altshuler 2015: 104)
Somewhat differently, Klecha (2016) argues that hope admits present-under-present
examples where the embedded eventuality occurs after the utterance time, as in (13).
(13) Martina hopes Carissa gets pregnant. (Klecha 2016: 2)
Considering our diagnostics for the HP above, (12) and (13) fail to overlap the
utterance time, while only (13) is eventive. As for aktionsart, replacing the stative
predicates in (11) and (12) with eventive predicates, such pick up my bicycle or enter
a room, leads to ungrammaticality, unless the predicates are interpreted habitually
(in which case they are double access). Finally, only (12) seems to make reference
to a story, but here we note an important difference from the examples in (4) and
(5b). In our cases, the embedded eventuality is part of the narrative, whereas the
embedding attitude is not (in both cases, that predicate serves to report a telling
of the narrative). In (12), by contrast, the whispering is arguably part of the story.
In that light, we note that converting (12) into the HP fails to license an eventive
predicate under whisper.
(14) Then Paula comes up to us, with horror in her eyes. She whispers in my
ear that {we’re in, #we enter} a room full of anti-communists and my
wife’s coat is bright red.
This suggests to us that, whatever the ultimate account of the cases in (11–13) is,
it is distinct from the cases we have been considering, where an embedded present
picks out a time anterior to the utterance and attitude time. For these reasons, we
will assume, for the remainder of the paper, that they have a separate explanation.4
4 For instance, the cases in (11) and (13) have been advanced as arguments against the Upper Limit
Constraint (ULC; Abusch 1997), which prohibits embedded tenses from following the embedding
attitude time (or its de nunc equivalent). If such critiques are accurate, the ULC will need revision.
As an alternative, it seems to us also possible that the present in (11) is generic or futurate.
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3 Free indirect discourse
Our cases of embedded present tense, then, look a great deal like the HP in unem-
bedded contexts: they are temporally disconnected from the utterance time, they
can be eventive, and they require a narrative anchor. Before moving on, though,
one additional comparator is salient. Free indirect discourse (FID) is a narrative
style that also interacts with indexicals. Its central temporal signature is that it shifts
temporal adverbials like today, but not tense (Banfield 1982; Doron 1991).
(15) She seated herself in silence again, rather sorry he had come to disturb her.
Today she did not want him. (D. H. Lawrence, The First Lady Chatterley)
By contrast, while the HP (embedded or unembedded) allows temporal adverbials
to shift, such a shift is optional (pace Schlenker (2004)). In (16), for example, it is
possible for yesterday to refer to the day before the time of utterance, while today
still shifts to the day of the eventuality described with the HP.
(16) A pipe bursts under my sink yesterday morning while I’m eating breakfast
and I’m panicking because I have a huge project deadline today.
Such mixed shifting is not attested for FID (though see Recanati 2000 for discussion
of “intrusive” FID).
Beyond this, FID seems to prohibit de re across the board, including de re uses
of names and definite descriptions (Doron 1991; Sharvit 2008).5 For example,
given Luke’s knowledge about his parentage in Star Wars: A New Hope, it is not
appropriate to report his guess about what has happened to Obi-Wan at the close of
the movie using any description other than Vader.
(17) {Vader, #His father, #Anakin} was fighting his master, Luke guessed.
Similarly, pronouns coreferent with the attitude holder must be read de se (Sharvit
2008: 370). Thus, for example, if Luke mistook a picture of himself grinning for
one of a young Leia, the use of masculine he is infelicitous, since Luke lacks the
appropriate de se thought.
(18) [Luke looks at a picture of himself as a child, mistaking it for one of Leia]
{She, #He} was so happy then! Luke thought.
5 For the purposes of simplicity, we will assume in what follows that we are in the world of Star
Wars, where there are many instances of double vision. Until now we have confined our attention
to non-fictional narratives and similar examples can be constructed using historical instances, e.g.,
George Eliot/Mary Ann Evans, though elaborating the contexts would require a great deal of space.
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Such restrictions do not hold for the HP, embedded or otherwise. For example, in The
Phantom Menace, Queen Amidala’s first meeting with Chancellor Palpatine/Darth
Sidious might be described as in (19). Similarly, the scene in (18) is fine in the HP
without FID, as shown in (20).
(19) Amidala descends from the glider, and the chancellor is waiting for her.
Though she’s never met him, she thinks that {Palpatine, Darth Sidious}
is so solicitous and urbane.
(20) Luke glances at a picture of himself as a child, mistaking it for one of
Leia. He thinks {she, he} must be so happy in the picture.
If embedded HPs were instances of something like FID, they would have to be able to
overcome FID’s allergy to de re interpretation of entities and temporal expressions.
To hammer this point home, it is worth noting that it is possible to have embedded
presents inside FID (i.e., situations where the main text tense is past), as long as
there is a sufficient narrative anchor, as in (21) which builds off of (19) above.
(21) Was someone working against her? Amidala wondered. She thought back
to the events leading up to the attack. When she meets him after fleeing
from Naboo, {Palpatine, #Darth Sidious} is so solicitous. And then, on
the Senate floor yesterday evening, he speaks glowingly about the Jedi,
Amidala reminded herself. But, this morning he is cold to her, so cold.
Importantly, FID here blocks a de re reading of the name Darth Sidious, unlike in the
“pure” HP use in (19). It thus appears that, while embedded presents are compatible
with FID, they cannot be reduced to it, given their differing properties with respect to
de re. Looking forward to the discussion in Section 4, the availability of presents in
FID, as in (21), will suggest that embedded presents are also unlikely to be a species
of de re temporal interpretation, given FID’s general prohibition on de re.
4 The proposal
We propose that the HP is the product of a silent intensional operator, NAR, akin to
Lewis’s (1978) fiction operator. In Section 5, we will take a closer look at Lewis’
operator, considering how its intensionality allows the same operator to account for
the HP both in fictional and non-fictional narratives. For now, though, we concentrate
on tense and the temporal components of NAR.
NAR shifts the relevant temporal perspective for tense to a temporal vantage point
on a salient narrative. Building on existing bicontextual semantics (Schlenker 2004;
Sharvit 2008; Anand & Toosarvandani 2017), we take both present and past tense to
be indexical to the time coordinate of a context of assessment (a), in MacFarlane’s
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(2003) terms; this is formally distinct from the context of utterance (u) that encodes
contextual information about the speech situation.
(22) a. J PRESi Ku,a,g = g(i); defined iff g(i)⊆ TIME(a)
b. J PASTi Ku,a,g = g(i); defined iff g(i)< TIME(a)
To account for the HP in root contexts, it would sufficient if the pragmatics of speech
permitted an utterance to be interpreted relative to a context of assessment distinct
from the context of utterance (Schlenker 2004; Anand & Toosarvandani 2017).
Then, TIME(a) could be an interval distinct from TIME(u) wide enough to contain
non-stative eventualities, thereby by capturing the grammatical hallmarks of the HP.
But if the choice of TIME(a) is reserved solely for the utterance, there would be
no way to capture embedded presents: changing TIME(a) for the entire utterance will
not capture the fact that, in (4), the embedding predicate is canonically interpreted
before lawyer’s speech act, but after the time of Clark’s traffic incident. Thus, some
way of shifting TIME(a) is needed in embedded environments. This is what the NAR
operator accomplishes. It is a temporal perspective shifting version of, roughly, in
that story, so that our examples of embedded presents can be paraphrased informally
along the following lines:
(23) a. And you said, in your account of the traffic incident, you are moving
15 miles an hour. = (4)
b. I can’t remember how long, in the account of this trip, it takes him.
= (5a)
c. In a 2007 interview, she said that, in her autobiographical narrative,
she leaves work to raise her family that year.
= (5b)
This is, admittedly, a somewhat complicated bundle of operations, and so before
we present a more formal account of the NAR operator, it is useful to first eliminate
some less elaborate alternatives.
4.1 Two possible approaches
There are two other, intuitively reasonable ways of dealing with the issue of embed-
ded presents, though both face empirical challenges.
The first would be to analyze these embedded tenses as bound, building on the
semantics of sequence of tense. All theories of sequence of tense allow for such
“null” tenses, illustrated in the LF in (24b). The lexical semantics of the attitude
predicate identifies this bound time with the de nunc time of the attitude, which can
account for “simultaneous” readings of past-under-past sentences.
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(24) a. Warren said that she lived in Boston.
b. PAST4 Warren say-w0 λ13λ7λ2 t7 she13 live-w2 in Boston
How bound tenses receive the pronunciation they do is the subject of theoretical
debate (see Ogihara & Sharvit 2012). But they can only be realized in this way in
the presence of a “trigger,” a superordinate tense with the same morphological tense
(or a congruent attitudinal nominal, e.g., Warren’s statement that. . . ).
In the case of our embedded presents in (4–5), the matrix attitude predicate
cannot serve as a suitable morphological trigger — it is invariably in the past tense
— and, furthermore, the embedded eventuality precedes the de nunc time. One could
imagine a silent, but morphologically active, operator OPν that would bind a tense
and set it to an anaphorically retrieved time interval (ν).
(25) J OPν λt φ Ku,a = 1 iff Jλt φ Ku,a(ν) = 1
This would intervene between the attitude predicate and the embedded clause,
serving as the relevant morphological trigger for the embedded bound tense:
(26) a. Warren said that she leaves work.
b. PAST4 Warren say-w0 λ13λ7λ2 OPν λ8 t8 she13 leave-w2 work
In this approach, not only does the morphological presence of OPν lack motivation,
but it also fails to capture that it is not just the present tense that shifts in HP contexts.
All tenses can shift, including past tenses, as in (27a–b).
(27) a. Warren says that she is fired after she announced her pregnancy.
b. Clark said that he (had) nearly collided before, and so he gingerly
approaches the intersection.
The announcing and colliding in (27a–b) are anterior to some salient time containing
the firing and approach, respectively. Thus, our cases of embedded presents cannot
simply involve the binding of a tense: it is a general evaluation point for tense that is
shifted.6
A different approach is suggested by Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2014). They
take the embedded present in (11) to be a de re tense, raising the possibility that our
cases might be de re HPs. To make this concrete, we can assume that temporal de re
is an instance of res-movement (Heim 1994), where the attitude predicate sayρ takes
the de re interval and a temporally-centered proposition p as arguments.
6 It would be possible in principle to place OPν so it does not scope over the past tense clauses in (27),
but this fact about past tense is quite general. Ultimately, it will have to scope solely over the present
tense.
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(28) J sayρ Ku,a = λtλpλx . 1 iff ∀〈x′, t ′,w′〉 compatible with
SPEECHx,w,t [p(x′)(ρ(x′)(t ′)(w′))(w′) = 1]
According to (28), sayρ does not evaluate p with respect to the de nunc time t ′, but
the counterpart of the res-moved tense under the de re acquaintance relation ρ. The
LF for (26) is the following under this approach:7
(29) PAST4 Warren say-w0 [OPµ PRES16] λ13λ7λ2 t7 she13 leave-w2 work
This proposal relies on a temporal shifting operator for the historical present, OPµ,
which sets TIME(a) to a salient interval µ, as in the bicontextual theories of the HP
we discussed above.
(30) J OPµ α Ku,a = Jα Ku,a[TIME→µ]
Since the HP is achieved by an operator, it can apply narrowly to the res, thereby not
affecting the matrix canonical past. As it stands, the embedded past tenses in (27)
will not be shifted. However, this is a result of technical simplifications: in an LF
that allows multiple res terms, one could move multiple tenses with OPµ on top of
all of them. This is an important improvement over the binding analysis: since past
and present are both sensitive to the same temporal evaluation point, shifting this
one point affects both tenses at once.
Despite these benefits, we do not believe that this account can work because
of an empirical problem that we introduced in Section 3. Embedded presents are
licensed in FID, even though FID blocks de re interpretation, including for temporal
adverbials and for present tense in double access uses. While we cannot rule out
that there is a special proviso on that ban (as, indeed, seems to hold for personal
pronouns; Sharvit 2008), it seems deeply stipulative.
In addition, while we have concentrated on the HP in non-fictional narratives,
we note that the same puzzles exist for the HP in fictional narratives. A fictional
narrative can be told or reported with past or present tense, in both embedded and
unembedded environments:
(31) (Grace thought that) {Anakin, Vader} {lost, loses} his pod race.
In this way, fictional narratives are linguistically exactly like non-fictional narratives.
Now, it may be that the embedded present in (31) arises for a different reason than
the one in (5b), but under the de re theory we have been considering, it must be for
a different reason: there is often no particular salient interval we are considering.
7 Here, the acquaintance relation is a centered individual concept, perhaps something of the form
λxλtλw . the unique t ′′ such that t ′′ is the the final day of x’s first trimester in w at t, and we suppress
the condition of acquaintance, namely that ρ(Warren)(g(4)(g(0)) = g(16).
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Indeed, as stories stray further from our world, the constraints on when they take
place become so vague that we often do not even ponder them. Put this way, the
problem in (31) is not why the embedded present is licensed, but rather, why any
tense is licensed.
4.2 The narrative operator (a first pass)
Taking stock, we have argued for four points. First, there exist embedded instances
of the HP, which are a prima facie challenge for utterance-level pragmatic accounts
of the HP. Second, all instances of the HP, whether embedded or not, involve a
narrative anchor. Third, a profitable way of thinking about the HP is as shifting
an indexical coordinate (as opposed to binding). Finally, whatever is responsible
for the shift should be possible under FID (and hence cannot be attributed to de re
interpretation mechanisms).
As we prefigured earlier, our approach builds on Lewis’s (1978) fictional oper-
ator, an intensional operator that, as a first approximation, quantifies over worlds
compatible with a story. It is this link to a story that serves to capture the narrative
anchor requirement. We incorporate the temporal shifting of OPµ in (30) into this
operator, identifying the interval µ with the timeline of the story. A first version of
NAR is given below:
(32) J NARn-ti-w j λw φ Ku,a,g = 1 iff
∀w′ such that w′ is a world compatible with g(n) in w j at ti,
for the smallest interval t ′ containing the events of g(n) in w j at ti,
Jλw φ Ku,a[TIME→t
′],g(w′) = 1
A narrative is modeled here as a conversational background (abstracting away from
how a narrative conversational background needs to be organized). The NAR operator
is anaphoric to some salient narrative g(n) in the context, quantifying over those
worlds compatible with the propositions in the conversational background evaluated
at the local world w j and time t j. This sensitivity to local evaluation allows, for
example, for Warren’s version of her narrative to vary from statement to statement,
while still allowing those accounts to be about the same thing, Warren’s history.
The semantics in (32) shifts TIME(a) to the timeline of the narrative, thereby
enabling the HP. Given this, an LF and semantics for (27) can be sketched as follows:
(33) a. PAST4 Warren say-w0 λ13λ7λ2 NAR9-t7-w2 λ5 PRES16 she13 leave-w5
work
b. ∀〈w, t,x〉 ∈ SPEECHWarren,g(4),g(0) ∀w′ compatible with g(9) in w
at t ∃e [leave(e,x,w′)& τ(e)⊆ g(16)];
defined iff g(16)⊆ the smallest interval containing the events
of g(n) and g(4)< TIME(u)
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The same logic holds for presents embedded below an FID operator like that of
Sharvit (2008): the world and time indices of NAR will instead be bound by the FID
operator. Since t ′ is determined by the story timeline within the attitudinal world of
evaluation, we do not encounter the problems for the de re HP theory.
While we have illustrated this for a non-fictional narrative, note that this seman-
tics also captures uses of the HP in fiction, like (31), since t ′ would be set to, for
example, the interval for The Phantom Menace. It does not, however, deal with past
tense in fictional narratives, one of the goals we set for ourselves, and so we must
elaborate on the semantics for NAR in (32). In order to do this, we have to determine
what the difference between the past and present in (31) amounts to. Intuitively, this
seems to be a difference in temporal viewpoint — with the HP, the events of the
narrative transpire simultaneous with a temporal perspective, TIME(a), while with
the past, the narrative view is backwards looking. That is, the difference amounts to
a choice in vantage point on the narrative. Although a narrative conversational back-
ground contains a series of thematically coherent eventualities, it does not provide
an intrinsic temporal perspective on those eventualities, leaving that perspective a
choice of the telling.
In this light, we propose to make the temporal vantage point a component of the
semantics of NAR:
(34) J NARn-ti-w j λw φ Ku,a,g = 1 iff
∀〈w′, t ′〉 such that w′ is a world compatible with g(n) in w j at ti and
t ′ is the temporal vantage point on g(n) in w j at ti,
Jλw φ Ku,a[TIME→t
′],g(w′) = 1
The tenses used in a narrative thus reflect the relation between temporal vantage
point and the timeline of the narrative. Many canonical tellings (fictional or not)
involve a vantage point posterior to the events of the story, leading to a narrative
past, while the HP, as we have seen, results from a vantage point of the entire
story timeline. In principle, we might expect any number of additional relations,
but some are much rarer than others. For example, the temporal vantage point
could precede the narrative timeline, though to our knowledge this is a vanishingly
rare choice, reserved for famously experimental works like Brooke-Rose’s (1984)
Amalgamemnon. The vantage point could also be set to a time inside the timeline, so
that some events are in the past, others in the present, and still others in the future.
This style is actually quite common in non-fictional narrative features, using the
events of the hook of the feature as vantage point. As for fiction, Kelsey Sasaki (p.c.)
pointed us to the Chiang (1998) novella “The story of your life” (the basis for the
movie Arrival), which is told entirely from the vantage point of the moment before a
(foreseen) conversation that introduces the novella, not unlike the function of the
hook in non-fictional features. Thus, it appears that vantage points are remarkably
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flexible, though we leave the task sorting out why some forms are uncommon to
future work.
5 Considering intensionality
One of the signatures of our account is a linking of the possibility of temporal
shifting to intensionality. While it is reasonable to suggest that works of fiction (and
thus discussions about those works) invokes some form of intensionality, it is less
clear that instances of non-fiction should as well. We might even wonder whether
they should be assimilated to the fictional cases at all, as arising from the same NAR
operator.
Evidence for an additional layer of modality even in non-fictional cases comes
from examples in the HP like (35–36), where a proposition that must hold in the
narrative is not veridical relative to the local evaluation world.
(35) Sean went to the Oval Office to get the story straight about the Trump
Tower meeting. He thought that (in the White’s House account,) Don Jr.
and Kushner go to talk about Russian adoptions. But he wanted to make
sure.
(36) Ruth only paid cursory attention to the news coverage of the birther move-
ment in 2008. She couldn’t remember whether (in the birther narrative,)
Obama is born in Kenya or in Nigeria. But she did know that he is born in
Africa.
Sean Spicer, surely, does not really believe that the two brothers-in-law went to
Trump Tower to talk about Russian adoptions (rather: he knows they went to discuss
Putin’s request to lift sanctions on Russian nationals). Nor does Ruth really believe
the birther lie that Obama is not a natural-born citizen. Here, the issue is what each
of them thinks the content of some salient narrative is, and the proposed operator in
(34) predicts these readings. This is because NAR is rather silent on the intent and on
the success of a narrative. It does not comment on whether the narrative g(n) is true,
be it relative to the local world w j or matrix world w0, and more generally, it does
not encode any notion of the world that a story is about.8
But the intensional component of the NAR operator, in its current form, is too
simplistic for reasons Lewis (1978: 39) discusses, and it is important to determine
whether Lewis’ worries prevent us from pursuing a unified semantics for fictional
8 Introducing an explicit notion of the world that a story is about may seem relatively harmless for non-
fiction, but it is significantly more fraught for fiction. Stories never provide a complete description
of any world, and so it is not clear what world a fictional narrative would be about. Such a move
would also risk getting tangled up in the perilous question of whether there are such things as fictional
worlds (see, for instance, Walton 1990: 55–77 for discussion).
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and non-fictional narratives. One of his main concerns was accounting for how
understanding of fiction happens against a background of contingent facts about the
actual world.9 In Lewis’ paradigm example, we understand that Sherlock Holmes’
flat on Baker Street is closer to Paddington Station than Waterloo Station, even
though a map of London is not part of the story. Quantifying over all worlds
compatible with just the propositions in the story, as NAR in (34) does, would
incorrectly admit worlds in which his lodgings are closer to Waterloo. Intuitively,
such worlds are excluded due to facts about London in the actual world, but precisely
how that intuition should be cached out has been the subject of substantial inquiry
since Lewis’ original work (Walton 1990; Woltserstorff 1980; Currie 1990; Phillips
1999; Woodward 2011; Friend 2017). Here, we will review the distinctions drawn
and, without trying to resolve any issues, content ourselves with asking how they
might affect our project of folding non-fictional narratives in with fictional ones.
5.1 Reality in stories
When hearing or reading a story, we automatically fill in innumerable details. In the
world of The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, we understand London to have the
same geography as in our own world, but we do not understand, as Lewis points out,
Holmes to have a third nostril or to have visited Saturn. This type of reasoning, he
argues, is like counterfactual reasoning. Thus, Lewis proposes that the prejacent is
evaluated at worlds that are not only compatible with the story, but also are the best
such worlds based on some metric. He considers two possible orderings for fictional
narratives. Given the discussion above, one reasonable ordering involves similarity
to the actual world, much as in orthodox accounts of counterfactual conditionals.
Setting aside the necessary temporal component that we were concerned earlier,
Lewis’ operator can be stated in Kratzerian terms, as in (37), with an ordering source
( f ) that is totally realistic: {p : p is true in w j}.10
(37) J NARn-w j λw φ Ku,a,g = 1 iff
∀w′ ∈ max f (w j)({w
′ : w′ is compatible with g(n) in w j at ti}),
Jλw φ Ku,a,g(w′) = 1
As Lewis and many others have pointed out, however, requiring a totally realistic
ordering renders fiction too similar to counterfactuals, too dependent on the actual
9 Lewis’ other main concern is that it is not just stories themselves that seem relevant for determining
truth in fiction, but also their tellings, which contribute situational context and paralinguistic or vocal
features to render each telling unique. This is missing from our account currently.
10 In our discussion here, we set aside entirely the problem of impossible fictions, or stories with




world. For example, many details simply go unmentioned in fiction, and so a totally
realistic ordering would make it true in our world to say (38).11
(38) (In The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes,) Trump wins the 2016 election.
A similar problem arises when authorial privilege (an arguably constitutive property
of fiction) conflicts with what is true in w j. For example, in The Adventure of the
Speckled Band, Holmes concludes that a murder was effected via an adder which
climbs up a bell rope to reach the victim, despite the actual world fact that the species
of adder in question cannot climb. With a totally realistic ordering source, it would
be true to say (39), contrary to Holmes’ putative infallibility, and, more importantly,
Conan Doyle’s prerogatives as author (no matter whether he is mistaken about the
nature of the actual world).
(39) (In The Adventure of the Speckled Band,) Holmes makes a mistake.
At the same time, Lewis cautions from investing too much in the beliefs of the
author — or the audience — alone: if Conan Doyle believed in purple gnomes, their
existence would not as a consequence become part of the world of Sherlock Holmes
(nor would it if a member of the audience did). Instead, Lewis’ proposal aims to
strike a middle-course, making truth in a fiction dependent on the “collective beliefs
of the community of origin” of the story. Concretely, f in (37) would then be: {p : p
is a collective belief of the community of origin of g(n) in w j}. For the cases we
have considered so far, this seems to make the right cut, given common beliefs about
locations in London, the prevalence of third nostrils, or the possibility of traveling to
Saturn.
But Lewis’ seemingly reasonable approach runs into its own problems, as much
subsequent investigation has uncovered. As Walton observes, ordering sources
grounded in collective beliefs still require restriction to story-relevant propositions
— (In the Adventures of Sherlock Holmes,) God exists does not seem to be true, even
though Victorians were collectively theists. And, of course, this kind of ordering
threatens to turn comprehension of a work of fiction into an originalist project Friend
(2017), so that verifying a claim like In Wolf Hall,... would require knowing what
people today believe about the Tudor era.
The most important point, however, seems to be that, even granting a role to
collective beliefs in determining the story worlds, there clearly seem to be other
factors. Lewis himself acknowledges that something more is needed to allow for
what he calls intra- and interfictional carryover: genre conventions or other fictional
11 The solution to this problem may lie in simply restricting the ordering source to those facts that are
relevant for the story (Walton 1990: 149–150), though then the question becomes how to decide
which propositions are the ones that belong in the background of the story.
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conventions, which exceed any specific fictional work (for instance, the appropriate
gait for a zombie or where leprechauns hide gold; arguably, Holmes’ infallibility is
another example). And, Walton points (p. 162) to the suicide of Mrs. Verloc in the
Secret Agent, which is described solely through a newspaper headline: “Suicide of
lady passenger from a cross-channel boat.” The collective beliefs of the community
of origin are completely unhelpful for ensuring that the claim (In the Secret Agent,)
Mrs. Verloc committed suicide is true; rather, what is needed are beliefs about how
authors tend to signal important events indirectly in narrative works.
The above considerations lead to the conclusion that there is no simple, universal
ordering source for the NAR operator, at least as far as fiction is concerned. Indeed,
such a conclusion feels appropriate for fictional narratives, which are, informally
speaking, about a “story world” that is by its very nature underdetermined.
5.2 Accounting for non-fiction
In sharp contrast to the complexities of fiction, non-fictional narratives are quite
simple. They are about the actual world, which is not under-determined; the method
for ascertaining the truth of a non-fictional narrative consists entirely of inspecting the
actual world. Thus, while Lewis’ attention was drawn entirely to fiction, his operator
can be extended to narratives about the actual world by taking the ordering source
for these to necessarily be totally realistic. Thus, we revise our proposal for the
NAR operator as follows, integrating the temporal component with a counterfactional
semantics, as Lewis proposes:
(40) J NARn-w j λw φ Ku,a,g = 1 iff
∀〈w′, t ′〉 such that w′ ∈ max f (w j)({w
′ : w′ is compatible with g(n)
in w j at ti}) and t ′ is the temporal vantage point on g(n) in w j at ti,
Jλw φ Ku,a[TIME→t
′],g(w′) = 1, where f is:
(i) totally realistic, i.e., {p : p is true in w j}, or (non-fiction)
(ii) a product of the collective beliefs of the community of origin
of g(n) and any other relevant considerations (fiction)
Like a modal, the ordering source for NAR varies by context. When it is anaphoric
to a story that is intended to describe the actual world, the ordering source is totally
realistic; when it is fictional, a different, more complex ordering is involved. It may
even be that the ordering source for fiction is not constant, varying by context with
what is important about the story to conversational participants.
When the ordering source is totally realistic, the intensionality of the NAR
operator will not always be directly observable. Sometimes it is, as in the narratives
we considered in (35–36), where the propositions in the story are not veridical
relative to the attitude holder’s doxastic state, even if they are about the actual world.
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But when a non-fictional narrative is veridical — when all propositions in g(n) are
true in w j — then NAR φ will be true in w j just in case φ is true in w j. In this case,
then, the intensionality will be felt solely through the need for a salient story in the
context, for a narrative anchor. We saw this for the HP in root contexts, as in (8), and
we see it also when the HP is embedded under an attitude verb. Omitting the prefix
in the Senate report in (41) is only possible when a salient narrative is available.
(41) Biden pointed to the Senate report on Burisma’s activities in Ukraine. He
reiterated that( in the Senate report,) Hunter does nothing wrong.
Our account, then, draws no essential difference between fiction and non-fiction
stories, leaving that job to the contextual vagaries of ordering. This seems a desirable
outcome, since we have found no linguistic correlates of the difference. For the same
reason, our account also does not differentiate between stories that vary along the
other dimensions we have considered (verdical vs. non-veridical and true in actual
world vs. not).
6 Conclusion
We began this paper with a puzzle about non-utterance indexical embedded present
tense, using it to argue for an intensional source for the historical present and for a
more capacious version of Lewis’ modal fictional operator, one that is compatible
with non-fictional narratives. Our proposal gives rise to a host of questions. One
set of questions relates to the distributional restrictions on NAR: Can it go in other
places besides root and attitude-embedded environments? We believe it can, such as
under epistemic modals (e.g., Warren finally exits after Super Tuesday. She must get
a phone call from a trusted colleague.) and causal connectives like because, and we
look forward to probing this possibility further. Another set of questions concerns the
structure of narratives and how it interfaces with the temporal vantage point. Here,
we have rendered narratives as conversational backgrounds, but stories arguably
have a rich internal structure, not only the story-internal timeline of events (what
narratologists call the fabula), but also the way a telling describes those events (the
syuzhet). We suspect that the mereology of both fabulas and syuzhets is exploited
by language users when setting temporal vantage points (otherwise, how could past
tense be used to describe events previously described in a piece in the HP?). Moving
forward on these points will undoubtedly require a more nuanced view of how times
are conceived in narratives than the story we have begun here.
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